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Raghbendra Jha and John Whalley
7.1 Introduction
This paper explores the environmental regime in developing countries.
By regime, we mean those environmental externalities that are commonly
found in the developing world, along with the policy responses, if any, to
them. Included are the direct eﬀects of industrial emissions, air- and water-
quality impacts of untreated waste (industrial and human), congestion ef-
fects of traﬃc, soil erosion, and open-access resource problems (includ-
ing forests).
We note the many diﬃculties involved with adequately characterizing
this regime, not the least of which is the heterogeneity across both environ-
mental problems and policy responses in the developing world. Enforce-
ment and compliance (which are typically lax in developing countries) also
play a central role in deﬁning this regime. In addition, we note the diﬀer-
ences between the experiences of developed and developing countries more
generally beyond the environmental area.
In the paper we make three main points. The ﬁrst is that there is a
tendency in much of the literature of the last few years to equate environ-
mental problems in developing countries with pollutants (or emissions).
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217Such an approachhas been partly inﬂuenced bydata availability, including
that collected by the Global Environmental Monitoring System (GEMS)
supported by the United Nations Environmental Program (UNEP). This
has yielded data on a range of environmental indicators including biologi-
cal oxygen demand (BOD), airborne SO2 concentrations, heavy metal
levels,1 untreated human waste, and other air- and water-quality indica-
tors. This focus on pollutants has meant that in much of the literature
there is less emphasis on what others have called degradation. This refers
to the eﬀects of uninternalized externalities seen in soil erosion, conges-
tion, open-access resources, and other problems, where physical emissions
are less of a problem. The paper argues that discussing environmental
problems in developing countries (or comparing them with those in devel-
oped countries) without reference to these problems is incomplete; their
eﬀects are large and pervasive, and their severity and interaction with eco-
nomic progress often diﬀer sharply from the eﬀects of pollutants.
The second point is in many ways an elaboration of the ﬁrst. We have
reviewed studies of the social costs associated with incomplete internaliza-
tion of the externalities we list. The studies that are available are limited
in their coverage of both countries and items and, in addition, do not
always use consistent methodologies; but the picture they paint is that
such costs seem large (perhaps in excess of 10 percent of GDP on an
annual basis in some countries), and that these costs are dominated by
degradation rather than by pollutant eﬀects (accounting for perhaps three-
quarters of the total eﬀect). One implication we draw is that with large
cost estimates of inaction, environmental policy in developing countries
should perhaps have a higher ranking than it has currently, especially if
these cost estimates substantially exceed those of inaction with regard to
more conventional policy reform such as tax or trade policy. The other is
that if the balance of costs is skewed more to degradation than to the
eﬀects of pollutants, degradation should perhaps receive more attention in
the literature.
Our third point concerns the relationship among growth, policy reform,
and environmental quality; and comparisons of the environmental situa-
tion either across economies or over time in light of our characterization
of the environmental regime in developing countries. To the extent that
recent literature focuses on diﬀerences in outcomes across countries or
over time in terms of levels of various environmental indicators, the issue
is whether degradation eﬀe c t sc a ng i v ead i ﬀerent picture. We argue that
degradation eﬀects could well behave diﬀerently from pollutants eﬀects;
soil erosion problems, for instance, seem to progressively recede as income
per capita rises, since the population in agriculture falls and plot sizes rise;
while outward-oriented trade policies draw labor into urban areas from
1. Lead, arsenic, mercury, and cadmium.
218 Raghbendra Jha and John Whalleyrural areas, adding to congestion. We discuss the literature on the environ-
mental Kuznets curve (Shaﬁk and Bandopadhyay 1992; Grossman and
Krueger 1995; Andreoni and Levinson 1998) and recent literature on trade
and environment (Copeland and Taylor 1994, 1995; Antweiler, Copeland,
and Taylor 1998). While the authors contributing to these literatures are
clear in labeling their analyses as primarily of pollutant levels, users of this
research naturally tend to think of the results as giving guidance on the
wider environmental situation in the countries discussed; and without ex-
plicit reference to degradation eﬀects, the picture once again can be incom-
plete.
In the ﬁnal section, the paper argues that the welfare gains from moving
to full internalization would seem to be the more appropriate comparative
measure of the severity of environmental problems across countries (or
changes over time). The studies referred to seem to suggest that internal-
ization gains relative to GDP are signiﬁcant for developing countries (and
probably larger than for developed countries), raising the issue of why
a higher degree of internalization has not occurred. We discuss brieﬂy
whether this outcome reﬂects income elasticities of demand for environ-
mental quality above 1; or whether it reﬂects technology and capital inten-
sity of environmental management and policy enforcement, so that abate-
mentcosts indeveloping countriesare thebarrier. Wealso touchonthe role
of the political structure in these countries, and on whether a key problem
is also in deﬁning and enforcing property rights. In the process we discuss
the links between poverty and degradation taken up by Maler (1998).
In concluding, the paper discusses the implications of our characteriza-
tion of the environmental regime in developing countries for environmen-
tal policy in these countries. Can the policy regimes in developed countries
be simply transferred, or are there special features that need to be taken
into account? Degradation, property rights, and compliance issues seem
to be more prominent for developing than for developed countries.
7.2 The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries
We interpret the term “environmental regime” as applied to the devel-
oping countries to mean the set of externality-related problems often char-
acterized as environmental, as well as the policy response they induce.
Individually, these cover soil erosion, open-access resources (forests and
ﬁsheries), congestion (traﬃc), household emissions (fuel burning), indus-
trial emissions, ground- and surface-water resources (shared aquifers and
water-table problems), untreated human and nonhuman waste, and other
problems. Property rights and their lack of clear deﬁnition, and com-
pliance with environmental controls are two factors closely connected
with these problems. Policy responses include regulation (command and
control), local actions (village level concerning soil erosion), resource-
The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries 219management policies (forests), and infrastructure development (urban
congestion).
For the purpose of our later discussion, we classify these externalities
into two broad headings: pollutants, covering industrial and household
emissions of various forms and untreated waste; and degradation, covering
soil erosion, congestion, and open-access resources. For both of these
problem areas, we identify the classical externality literature that applies:
A Pigouvian tax will internalize the externality, and the Coasian issues of
the assignment of property rights and whether partial internalization can
take place through bi- (or multi-)lateral deals once property rights are es-
tablished also arise.
We could group these externalities in other ways, such as agriculture and
rural externality problems, urban externality problems, and environmental
problems associated with varying forms of industrial waste. The reasons
for grouping these environmental problems in the way we do here relate
primarily to measurement issues. They do not reﬂect any major analytical
distinction in terms of the economics, even though, for instance, open-
access externality problems for renewable resources have a complex ana-
lytical literature characterizing both how replacement of the stock occurs
and what constitutes optimal policy across sustainable harvests. Pollutants
capture emissions and contaminants of various forms, which can be moni-
t o r e db ys u c he ﬀorts as GEMS. Degradation captures environmental ef-
fects for which emissions and contaminants are not the central issue, and
for which direct monitoring is more problematic.
We note in passing that the developing countries in which these regimes
occur are far from a homogenous group of countries. They vary by per
capita income, GDP growth rates, size, the volume and pattern of their
international trade, their degrees of urbanization, and many other charac-
teristics. They also vary in the form their environmental problems take;
some countries are heavily endowed with environmental assets such as
tropical forests,2 while others are arid and desert; some are mountainous,
while others are low lying and ﬂood prone. Generalizing across all devel-
oping countries and categorizing the environmental regimes they each face
is thus diﬃcult. A few generalizations seem to hold, however; for instance,
lower-income countries have proportionately more signiﬁcant agricultural
and rural sectors.
7.2.1 Elements of the Regime
Notwithstanding these problems, in table 7.1 we have set out what we
see as the main elements in our characterization of the environmental re-
2. Schatan (1998), for instance, notes that Latin America and the Caribbean account for
50 percent of the world’s tropical forests, and ﬁve of the ten countries richest in biodiversity
worldwide are in the region (Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico, and Peru).
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degradation already discussed.
Pollutants in the form of toxic contaminants cover eﬄuents of various
types, which come largely from mines, chemical production, pulp and pa-
per plants, and leather and tanning factories. They include organic chlo-
rines, dioxins, pesticides, grease and oil, acid, and caustic metals. These
generate health and other problems. The U.N. Human Development Report
(HDR) (U.N. 1998) estimates that Asia’s rivers, on average, contain lead
levels 20 times in excess of those in European and North American coun-
tries, and claims, by way of example, that in China most toxic solid waste
is disposed of in municipal waste streams without treatment.
A second category of pollutant-based externality problems consists of
those associated with water quality and untreated ﬂuid waste. It is com-
mon in many countries for there to be untreated sewage discharges into
rivers, streams, and open ditches. The 1998 HDR suggests that as much
as 50 percent of all discharges into waterways in developing countries are
untreated. These, in turn, generate signiﬁcant health problems, including
waterborne diseases, which in some countries are rife. The HDR estimates
that diarrhea and dysentery account for an estimated 20 percent of the
total burden of disease in developing countries; that polluted water gener-
ates nearly 2 billion cases of diarrhea annually in the developing world;
and that diarrhea-related diseases cause the deaths of some 5 million
people annually, including 3 million children. They also estimate that con-
taminated water leads to 900 million cases of intestinal worms and 200
Table 7.1 A Pollutant and Degradation Classiﬁcation Scheme for Environmental
Externalities in Developing Countries
Pollutants
Toxic contaminants Organochlorines, dioxins, pesticides, grease and oil, acid, and caustic
metals (mainly discharges from mines, chemical producers, pulp and
paper plants, and leather and tanning factories), which cause health
and other problems
Untreated ﬂuid waste Untreated sewage discharges into rivers, streams, open ditches, which
causes waterborne disease
Domestic solid waste Poorly managed solid waste, which spreads infectious disease and blocks
urban drainage channels, with risk of ﬂooding and waterborne disease
Smoke and burning Burning dung, wood, coal, and crop residues; vehicle exhaust; and smoke,
which cause respiratory damage, heart and lung disease, and cancer
Degradation
Soil erosion Sedimentary transfer of topsoil to neighboring plots, river estuaries,
hydro dams, which causes silting, accompanied by leaching of soil
Soil quality Pesticide residues, which aﬀect production of neighboring plots
Open-access resources Ill-deﬁned property rights, which lead to overexploitation of resources
(ﬁrewood/forests, ﬁsheries; and shared aquifers and water tables)
Congestion and traﬃc Poorly regulated traﬃc, which causes time loss, elevated accident risk,
and lowered air quality in urban areas
The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries 221million cases of schistosomiasis, and that Asian rivers carry 50 times as
many bacteria from human excrement as rivers in European and North
American countries.3 The high level of arsenic linked to phosphoric fertil-
izers in groundwater, which kill some of the people who drink such water,
is a further problem in a number of countries.
Another component of the pollutant category is domestic solid waste.
In most developing countries, there are only limited solid-waste disposal
systems and the result is the spread of infectious diseases. The 1998 HDR
estimates that between 20 and 50 percent of domestic solid waste in these
countries remains uncollected, even with up to one-half of local govern-
ment spending in some countries going to waste collection. In some areas,
given the lack of sanitation, waste becomes mixed with excrement, further
contributing to the spread of infectious disease. Uncollected domestic
waste is the most common cause of blocked urban drainage channels in
Asian cities, which in turn increases the risk of ﬂooding and waterborne
disease. Poorer households in these countries tend to live near waste-
disposal sites.
Health-related problems (which include respiratory damage, heart and
lung disease, and cancer) due to smoke from burning and to vehicle ex-
haust in both urban and rural areas reﬂect another pollutant-based ele-
ment of the environmental regime. In lower-income countries, these prob-
lems come from burning dung, wood, and crop residues. The 1998 HDR
estimates that 90 percent of deaths globally due to air pollution are in the
developing world and of those 80 percent are due to indoor pollution.
Of the elements of degradation that we identify as part of the environ-
mental regime in developing countries, soil erosion is a major component;
although to identify the externality-related component one has to diﬀer-
entiate between on-site and oﬀ-site eﬀects. Erosion arises from a variety
of causes. One is population growth that results in progressive division of
plot sizes, with spillover of topsoil into neighboring plots, river estuaries,
hydro dams, and, in the case of countries with more desert areas, wind-
borne soil loss. The 1998 HDR estimates that in Burkina Faso and Mali,
one person in six has been forced to leave his or her land because it has
turned into desert and that desertiﬁcation has a worldwide annual cost of
$42 billion in lost income, $9 billion of which arises in Africa. Soil erosion
reduces agricultural productivity and in some cases the availability of ag-
ricultural lands per capita. Soil erosion has also had the eﬀe c to fr e d u c i n g
fodder available for cattle.
A recent survey paper on studies of the cost of soil erosion in developing
countries (Barbier 1998) places the annual losses by country in a range
from 1 to 15 percent of GDP. Alfsen et al. (1996), in a study of Nicaragua,
3. This is consistent with Hettige, Mani, and Wheeler’s (1997) ﬁnding that the environmen-
tal Kuznets curve does not hold for waterborne pollutants.
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1.26 percent, beans 2.52 percent, maize 2.41 percent, and sorghum 1.35
percent. Magrath and Arens (1989), in a study of soil-erosion losses in
Java in 1985, estimate annual losses of approximately 4 percent of the
value of crops harvested. Cruz, Francisco, and Conway (1988),4 examining
two watersheds in the Philippines and focusing only on additional sedi-
mentary costs for hydro-power installations (reduced water-storage capac-
ity for hydro power, reductions in the service life of the dam, and reduced
hydro power), estimate annual costs of $27 per hectare of agricultural land
in the watershed, a signiﬁcant portion of the value of crop yield. Soil-
quality problems arise from the leaching of pesticides to neighboring plots,
contaminating neighbors’ soil.
In addition to soil erosion and soil quality, other degradation-type exter-
nalities arise with open-access resources (resources for which the property
rights are ill-deﬁned or poorly enforced) and the overexploitation of these
resources. These include deforestation associated with land clearing, slash-
and-burn cultivation, squatting, and, in some countries, the collection of
ﬁrewood. These problems are especially severe in Africa and in Central
and Latin America; Schatan (1998), for instance, identiﬁes land degrada-
tion as the most serious environmental problem facing Latin and Central
America. For Ghana, one of the less severe cases, Lo ´pez (1997) estimated
that overcultivation of land at the expense of forests runs to 25 percent of
land use. Overexploitation of ﬁsheries is a further major problem. Shared
access to water through common aquifers and groundwater is yet a further
manifestation of the problem; this results in reduced water tables, causing
especially severe problems in the north China plain.
Finally, in this regime under the heading of degradation are urban con-
gestion problems. Rapid growth in urban population and vehicle densities,
especially in high-growth economies, leads to congestion. This lowers air
quality; increases the spread of infectious disease; and generates signiﬁ-
cant time loss from traﬃc, high accident rates, and noise. A 1990 study by
Japan’s International Cooperation Agency5 produced the estimate that
road congestion in Thailand (one of the worst cases) reduces potential
output in the Bangkok region by one-third.
In closing this discussion, we also note that the environmental regime in
developing countries is characterized by policy measures that frequently
exhibit lax enforcement. As in the developed world, the primary form that
environmental policy toward industrial emissions takes in developing
countries is the use of command and control instruments of various forms.
These involve the setting of standards and monitoring (with penalties for
4. Cited in Barbier (1998).
5. Cited in The Economist, 5 September 1998, although we should note that the estimate
is substantially in excess of those in other studies we mention later.
The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries 223violators), but a common feature is the presence of only limited compli-
ance due to weak enforcement. For household wastewater, soil erosion,
and other nonindustrial environmental problems, there is little or no
abatement of damage in many countries.
7.2.2 The Costs of Environmental Damage in Developing Countries
If this is the regime, what are its consequences? In table 7.2 we report
some estimates of the costs of environmental damage for six countries,
each associated with the elements of the regime we identify. Cost estimates
of this form are relatively few and are scattered throughout the literature.
The methods and data used to construct them are not always fully avail-
able, and there are variances in their ﬁndings. Most of these estimates do
not directly refer to the welfare costs of the environmental damage, but
instead use some other measure (such as the value of work time lost due to
health impacts). We rely heavily on a synthesis of studies of environmental
damage for a sample of Asian economies that has recently been drawn
together by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and reported in the 1998
HDR. These, together with results of a related study by the World Re-
sources Institute (WRI), are presented in table 7.2.
In the case of China, the ADB studies suggest that annual productivity
losses due to soil erosion, deforestation, and land degradation could be as
high as 7 percent of GDP for the early 1990s. If the health and productivity
losses from pollution in cities are added (in the region of 1.7–2.5 percent
of GDP), combined annual cost estimates from environmental damage are
in the region of 10 percent of GDP. Even this estimate excludes a number
of key components of environmental damage, such as those due to conges-
Table 7.2 Some Estimates of Environmental Costs in Selected Asian Countries
China Productivity losses due to soil erosion, deforestation and land degradation, water
shortages, and destruction of wetlands in 1990 of $13.9–26.6 billion annually or
3.8–7.3 percent of GDP; health and productivity losses from pollution in cities in
1990 of $6.3–9.3 billion or 1.7–2.5 percent of GDP
India Total environmental costs of $13.8 billion in 1992 or 6 percent of GDP; urban air
pollution costs of $1.3 billion; health costs from water quality of $5.7 billion; soil
erosion costs of $2.4 billion; deforestation costs of $214 million (traﬃc-related
costs, pollution costs from toxic wastes, and biodiversity losses excluded)
Indonesia Health costs of particulate and lead levels above WHO standards in Jakarta of $2.2
billion in 1989 or 2.0 percent of GDP
Pakistan Health impacts of air and water pollution and productivity losses from deforesta-
tion and soil erosion of $1.7 billion in the early 1990s or 3.3 percent of GDP
Philippines Health and productivity losses from air and water pollution in the Manila area of
$0.3–0.4 billion in the early 1990s or 0.8–1.0 percent of GDP
Thailand Health eﬀects of particulate and lead levels in excess of WHO standards of $1.6
billion or 2 percent of GDP
Source: Agarwal (1996); ADB (1997); U.N. (1998).
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based on 1988 data puts losses due to environmental degradation (farm-
land loss, nutrient loss, ﬂooding, and timber loss) at around 10 percent of
GDP, compared to losses from pollutants (waterborne pollutants that re-
duce crop yields, ﬁsh catches, industrial output; airborne pollution that
results in higher morbidity, reduced plant growth, damage to materials;
and soil pollution that reduces crop yields) of perhaps 2 percent of GDP.
Estimates of the cost of damage from a series of environmental sources
in India in 1992 are approximately 6 percent of GDP in the ADB studies.
The elements included urban air pollution, health costs from water quality,
soil erosion, and deforestation, while the study excludes traﬃc-related
costs, pollution costs from toxic wastes, and biodiversity losses.
The other studies included in table 7.2 are less complete in their cover-
age of environmental damage. Studies for Indonesia of the health costs of
particulate and lead levels (gasoline related) set these levels above those
laid down as standards by the World Health Organization (WHO), at ap-
proximately 2 percent of GDP in 1989. In Pakistan the health impacts of
air and water pollution along with productivity losses from deforestation
and soil erosion are estimated at approximately 3.5 percent of GDP in the
early 1990s. The ADB studies of the Philippines concentrate on the Manila
area alone and look at the eﬀects of lowered air and water quality; the cost
estimate for this component of damage is approximately 1 percent of GDP.
In Thailand, the health eﬀects of particulates and lead levels (gasoline
related) in excess of WHO standards are put at 2 percent of GDP.
Table 7.3 reports estimated time-loss costs from traﬃc congestion for a
sample of Asian cities. These are also cited in the 1998 HDR and are in
addition to those costs listed in table 7.2. For Bangkok time-related costs
from traﬃc are estimated at 2 percent of local product in 1994; these esti-
mates are 0.4 percent for Seoul in the same year. Health-related costs of
traﬃc are already included in the studies referred to in table 7.2.
Table 7.3 Estimates of Time Losses due to Traﬃc Congestion in Asian
Cities, 1994
Annual Cost of Time Delays Cost (percentage of
City (millions of dollars) local citywide product)
Bangkok 272 2.1




Hong Kong 293 0.6
Seoul 154 0.4
Source:WRI (1996); U.N. (1998).
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two more comprehensive country studies (China and India), the estimates
for the combined environmental damage are large, in the region of 10 per-
cent of GDP in the case of China, neglecting damage from additional
sources such as time loss in traﬃc. Given that model-based analyses of the
gains from more conventional policy reform (such as tax or trade reform)
in those countries often produce estimates that are lower (perhaps 1–3
percent of GDP), this suggests that environmental policy should perhaps
receive a higher weighting in the overall policy stance in these countries
than it does currently.
In addition, the composition of environmental damage costs in these
countries is striking. The studies of China in the ADB compendium sug-
gest that perhaps 70–80 percent of environmental damage occurs through
degradation, largely in rural areas; a range echoed in Smil (1992). While
the numbers for India are perhaps less dramatic, the high estimates of the
costs of soil erosion outside Asia6 seem to us to support our contention
that the degradation of the environment rather than damage caused by
pollutants may well be the more important environmental issue in devel-
oping countries.
7.2.3 Transborder Environmental Externalities and
the Environmental Regime in Developing Countries
Developing countries both contribute to and are aﬀe c t e db yar a n g eo f
transborder and global externality problems. In table 7.4 we list some of
the more major transborder and global environmental externalities in-
volved, both those aﬀecting and those contributed to by developing coun-
tries. These also form part of the typical environmental regime in devel-
oping countries, and, although we do not emphasize them here, we
mention them nonetheless.
Global warming is perhaps the more major transborder environmental
issue for the developing countries, with temperature rise and microclimate
changes as the projected outcome, combined with increased frequency of
extreme weather events. The possible impacts on developing countries are
thought to be potentially more signiﬁcant for low-terrain countries such
as Bangladesh, as are the adjustment problems faced by smaller countries
as microclimates change (such as in western Africa) and labor ﬂows
across borders.
Further transborder elements forming part of the environmental regime
in these countries include the thinning of the ozone layer, which increases
ultraviolet-light penetration of the atmosphere. These eﬀects are more se-
vere in the temperate climates of developed countries than in the devel-
oping countries, but the ability of the developing countries to abate dam-
age of this type is more limited than that in the developed world, especially
6. See Barbier (1998) and Schatan (1998).
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doors.
We also include problems associated with loss of biodiversity and defor-
estation as a part of the transborder and global regime. For loss of biodi-
versity, the issue is loss from the gene pool through ﬂora and fauna dam-
age. The environmental eﬀects of economic activities that aﬀect resources
with global existence value (including species and biodiversity) is one as-
pect. Shrimp farming, for instance, has grown in the last 2 decades from
initially low levels in Thailand and other countries, and with it has come
a signiﬁcant loss of mangroves and a resulting loss of biodiversity. Many
pharmaceutical products sold worldwide each year are generated from
forest-related sources in developing countries. The global impacts of forest
loss occur through many channels, including carbon-sink reduction and
impacts on existence value abroad. But forest loss also aﬀects local popula-
tions who use nontimber forest products can cause increased water runoﬀ
in the event of ﬂooding.
Acid-rain problems include airborne acid deposits aﬀecting buildings
and agricultural yields; these problems are especially signiﬁcant in such
areas as south and east China, north and east India, Korea, and Thailand.
The 1998 HDR reports that in areas in India that are close to SO2 emis-
sions sources (admittedly mostly originating in India) the wheat yields are
estimated to have been halved due to these emissions. While these global
and transborder externalities are also part of the environmental regime
in developing countries, both their impact on individual countries and
the contribution of countries to global damage because of them remain
poorly quantiﬁed.
7.3 Growth, Policy Reform, and the Environmental Regime
in Developing Countries
The discussion in section 7.2 emphasized the wide range of externalities
that make up the environmental regime in developing countries, along with
Table 7.4 Transborder and Global Environmental Externalities Aﬀecting
Developing Countries
Global warming Temperature rise and microclimate change, combined with increased fre-
quency of extreme weather events
Ozone depletion Thinning of ozone layer increases ultraviolet-light penetration of the at-
mosphere; eﬀect more severe in temperate climates
Biodiversity loss and Loss of gene pool through forest and wildlife erosion (e.g., mangrove
deforestation losses linked to shrimp farming); loss of forests aﬀects local popula-
tions who use nontimber forest products, reduces carbon absorption by
forests, and increases water runoﬀ in ﬂooding
Acid rain Airborne acid depositions; high in areas such as south and east China,
north and east India, Korea, and Thailand (e.g., wheat yields halved in
areas of India close to SO2 emissions)
The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries 227the seeming quantitative dominance of environmental problems associated
with degradation over those associated with pollutants. But how does this
regime change as countries grow? Does environmental quality improve or
worsen, and in what dimension and for what reasons? And what policy
measures contribute to the environmental situation, either positively or
negatively?
7.3.1 The Environmental Kuznets Curve
One of the more prominent of the recent discussions on these issues
focuses on the environmental Kuznets curve (EKC). The EKC refers to
the relationship between environmental indicators of certain types and per
capita incomes of countries; its origins lie in Kuznets’s work in the 1950s
on income inequality measures across developing countries, which docu-
mented a clear trend initially toward increased inequality as per capita
income grows, with a subsequent fall. This work suggested an inverted U
shape for a cross-country plot of an inequality measure such as a Gini
coeﬃcient against income per capita. The EKC hypothesis is that environ-
mental indicator levels ﬁrst rise (e.g., pollutant levels per capita rise) as
per capita income rises; then the relationship reverses after some threshold
level of income.
The implication drawn by some from EKC plots is that growth need not
be inconsistent with the objective of improving environmental quality in
the medium to longer run: Environmental concerns can be delinked from
growth objectives. Indeed, some authors have gone further and argued
that the best way to improve environmental quality is to follow policies
that make countries rich in the shortest possible time, since in the long run
there is no conﬂict between growth and environmental protection. Andre-
oni and Levinson (1998) and Jaegar (1999) have recently provided micro-
foundations for the EKC, arguing that the characteristics of cleanup tech-
nology are key to the EKC.
The ﬁrst paper in this area, by Shaﬁk and Bandopadhyay (1992) (a
background study for the 1992 World Development Report, World Bank
1992 with results given prominent proﬁle in the report itself), examines a
range of environmental indicators. These include lack of clean water, lack
of urban sanitation, ambient levels of suspended particulate matter
(SPM), ambient sulfur oxides, change in forest area during the period
1961–86, the annual rate of deforestation between 1961 and 1986, dis-
solved oxygen in rivers, fecal coliforms in rivers, municipal waste per cap-
ita, and carbon emissions per capita. Their sample consists of observations
of up to 149 countries for the period 1960–90, although their coverage is
incomplete. Some of the dependent variables are observed for cities within
countries, in other cases for countries as a whole. Only in the case of air
pollutants is an EKC type relation found. Lack of clean water and lack of
urban sanitation are found to decline uniformly, both with increasing in-
228 Raghbendra Jha and John Whalleycome and over time. Deforestation seems to be unrelated to income. River
quality tends to monotonically worsen with income.
Selden and Song (1994), following Shaﬁk and Bandopadhyay (1992),
focus exclusively on air pollutants in their examination of possible EKC
relationships. They study emissions of SO2,N O X, SPM, and CO. Emis-
sions are measured in kilograms per capita on a national basis with pooled
cross-sectional and time-series data drawn from WRI. The data are aver-
ages for 1973–75, 1979–81, and 1982–84. There are 30 countries in their
sample: 22 high-income, 6 middle-income, and 2 low-income countries.
Their results indicate that emissions of CO are independent of income,
whereas emissions of other pollutants follow an EKC pattern. However,
the turning points occur at much higher levels of income than in the Shaﬁk
and Bandopadhyay (1992) study.
Grossman and Krueger (1995) have subsequently investigated EKC re-
lationships using the GEMS cross-country data on air quality for the pe-
riod 1977–88 and isolate a series of environmental indicators: SO2 concen-
tration in selected cities, smoke, dissolved oxygen in water, BOD, chemical
oxygen demand (COD), nitrates, fecal coliform, total coliform, lead, cad-
mium, arsenic, mercury, and nickel. The data measure ambient air quality
a tt w oo rt h r e el o c a t i o n si ne a c ho fag r o u po fc i t i e si nan u m b e ro fc o u n -
tries during the period 1977–88. The number of observations varies over
time (52 cities in 32 countries in 1982, but only 27 cities in 14 countries in
1988). The authors claim that the data are representative of countries at
varying levels of economic development and with diﬀerent geographical
conditions, and they ﬁnd an EKC type relation for SO2, smoke, dissolved
oxygen, BOD, COD, nitrates, fecal contamination of rivers, and arsenic.
The evidence is less compelling for total coliform and heavy metals.
Also in the literature is Panayotou (1993), which estimates EKC-
type relationships for SO2,N O X, and SPM, and deforestation using cross-
sectional data for 1985 and, as in Selden and Song (1994), pollutants
measured in emissions per capita on a national basis. Panayotou ﬁnds
EKC-type relations for SO2,N O X, and SPM. Turning points were at levels
of income lower than those in Selden and Song (1994). Cooper and Grif-
ﬁths (1994), in contrast, estimate three regional (Africa, Latin America,
and Asia) EKCs for deforestation only, using pooled cross-sectional time-
series data for each region for the period 1961–91 and for 64 countries.
They ﬁnd no EKC relationship.
These ﬁndings are such that it is now often argued that attempts to
estimate EKC-type relationships should be conﬁned to air pollutants
alone, and, in particular, to SO2 emissions. As a result, drawing conclu-
sions from any EKC plot as to how overall environment damage behaves
as income changes is thought to be fraught with problems.
But even for SO2, the EKC does not appear to be a particularly robust
description in the current literature of the behavior of environmental pol-
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ber of econometric problems with EKC estimates, including violations of
homoscedasticity, the nonuse of random- and ﬁxed-eﬀects methods in
panel data, the improper deﬁnition of dependent and independent vari-
ables, and other problems. Kaufman et al. try to circumvent these diﬃ-
culties in their attempt to identify an EKC-type relation in the case of SO2,
deﬁning SO2 concentrations as annual average concentrations in ground-
level atmosphere at a particular location in a city. Using a panel of 23
countries (13 developed, 7 developing, and 3 centrally planned) during
the period 1974–89, their analysis shows an EKC-type relation between
emissions per capita and spatial intensity of economic activity, as well as
between emissions per capita and GDP per capita. However, they also ﬁnd
evidence that still further increases in income per capita lead to a further
increase in emissions per capita—an N-type rather than inverted-U-type
relation between emissions per capita and GDP per capita.
Unruh and Moomaw (1998) evaluate whether the transition from a high
emissions to a low emissions state occurs mechanically at a particular
income level, as suggested by earlier papers. They identify some industri-
alized countries that seem to have gone through EKC-type transitions,
discovering that these transitions span a broad range of income levels.7
Furthermore, the transitions occur abruptly and cotemporally and do not
appear to be the consequence of endogenous income growth. Rapid and
cotemporal historical events, technological progress, and the need to react
to external shocks seem to drive the EKC structure. Ekins (1997) argues
that the pattern of emissions of selected air pollutants does not indicate
the environmental impact of such emissions and examines an aggregate
indicator of environmental impact developed by the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Examining the relation-
ship between this indicator and income per capita, Ekins ﬁnds no evidence
i nf a v o ro fa nE K C .
Thus, even considered within its own conﬁnes, the relation between eco-
nomic growth and environmental damage seems more complex than por-
trayed by the EKC (Barbier 1997). There appears to be nothing automatic
about this relation, nor is any inference on causality necessarily justiﬁed.
Once degradation eﬀects are added in, drawing conclusions as to how
overall environmental quality changes with income is even more treacher-
ous. For instance, soil erosion problems, measured relative to aggregate
income, would seem to recede as growth occurs and (in relative terms) the
agricultural sector shrinks. But growth is accompanied by urbanization
7. In a recent paper, Torras and Boyce (1998) take the existence of the EKC at face value
and ask whether it is merely the level of income or also its distribution that aﬀects emissions
per capita. They argue that a more even distribution of income, higher literacy rates, and
other indicators of power lead to lower emissions per capita.
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transitional period when growth and new infrastructure are taking hold.
7.3.2 The Environmental Eﬀects of Policy Reform
(Trade and Environment)
A further strand of the recent literature attempts to assess how environ-
mental quality changes with policy changes, including trade liberalization;
in particular how various kinds of pollutant concentrations can be
aﬀected. Copeland and Taylor (1994), for instance, evaluate the role of
trade where environmental quality is a local public good (i.e., damage from
pollutants remain in the country). They consider a two-country single-
period equilibrium where goods diﬀer in pollution intensity in production.
Countries diﬀer in their endowment of a primary factor (human capital);
environmental quality in both countries is a normal good in preferences,
and, with assumed endogenous setting of pollution policy, the higher-
income country has higher environmental standards. They ﬁnd that free
trade shifts pollution-intensive production toward countries scarce in hu-
man capital and raises world pollution levels.
Copeland and Taylor (1995) consider a diﬀerent case where environ-
mental quality is a pure public good to which all countries are exposed.
Trade eﬀects are diﬀerent in this case, since relocation of pollution-
intensive industries to countries with less stringent environmental protec-
tion can increase the exposure of residents in the home country and works
against more conventional gains from trade. Since there are transborder
externalities in this case, nationally based pollution regulation does not
lead to Pareto optimality, and free trade need not raise welfare.
More recently, Antweiler, Copeland, and Taylor (1998) ﬁrst generate
and then test a series of propositions as to how economies behave in terms
of their trade and environment linkages. They assume a small, open econ-
omy formulation: The economy has a number of agents, produces two ﬁnal
goods, and uses two primary factors. One product is labor intensive and
involves no pollution, whereas the other is capital intensive and causes
pollution. They assume producers have access to an abatement technol-
ogy, which, for simplicity, only uses the polluting good as an input. They
also assume that the government uses emissions taxes to reduce pollution,
and, given the pollution tax rate, they generate a ﬁrm-level proﬁt function.
The level of the tax actually used is assumed to be an increasing function
of what an optimally set tax would be. This treatment allows government
behavior to vary across countries and also allows for environmental policy
to respond and diﬀer by country: On the demand side, consumers max-
imize utility, taking pollution as given; they assume preferences over goods
are homothetic, while there is constant marginal disutility of pollution.
The model allows them to decompose a total change in pollution levels
into scale, composition, and technique eﬀects. This, in turn, allows them
to generate a number of theoretical propositions to test. Thus, if economies
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countries export the polluting good, then pollution will be higher in the
country that is less open. Where the world price is ﬁxed, then for a given
level of income and for certain settings of key model parameters, they show
that the composition eﬀect associated with trade liberalization in such
countries is to increase pollution. These and other propositions as to how
the links between trade and environment operate emerge from their anal-
ysis as they focus on emissions associated with trade-related polluting
activity.
However, as our earlier discussion indicates, emissions are likely to con-
stitute only a portion of the overall welfare cost of environmental externali-
ties in liberalizing developing countries, and other environmental external-
ities may well have diﬀerent interactions with trade. Thus, if with increased
trade labor moves from rural to urban areas and if this generates increased
congestion, these adverse consequences linked to trade can easily domi-
nate the overall environmental impact compared to changes in emissions.
Impacts on soil erosion from agricultural trade liberalization abroad can
be adverse, while being beneﬁcial at home. Liberalization in the manufac-
tured sector can produce opposite implications for soil erosion. A wider
view of the environmental regime in developing countries can thus also
produce diﬀerent conclusions as to what the key linkages between policy
changes and the environment actually are.
7.4 Measuring the Degree of Environmental Failure
in Developing Countries
Given the preceding discussion, if pollutant levels across economies do
not provide a complete picture for the evaluation of comparative environ-
mental performance across countries or over time, either in analytical or
empirical work, what is a more appropriate way to proceed? Unfortu-
nately, the problem is not only the incomplete coverage of environmental
externalities in developing countries; one also needs estimates of damage
functions, which allow the losses involved to be computed in terms of wel-
fare. Thus, even if economies have high levels of emissions per capita, if the
ability to abate diﬀers across economies (such as health care capabilities to
deal with adverse eﬀects of emissions), then diﬀerences in emissions levels
across countries do not necessarily map onto comparable diﬀerential wel-
fare losses due to environmental failures. In the appendix to this chapter
we show for the special case of a stock externality that, even if an EKC
relationship is followed in emissions per capita, this need not map onto a
comparable relationship in terms of welfare.
For these reasons, therefore, an alternative approach is needed to evalu-
ate the signiﬁcance of environmental failures across economies or over
time, and hence to assess the impact of the environmental regime in devel-
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measure reﬂecting the severity of the departures from Pareto optimality
associated with externalities—how far away are economies from Pareto
optimality in a welfare sense, and what would be the potential welfare
gains from moving from the current allocation of resources with uninter-
nalized or partially internalized externalities to complete internalization?
The implied measure seems to be a money-metric measure (say a Hicksian
measure) of the gain from internalization relative to a current noninternal-
ized equilibrium. Income eﬀects associated with diﬀerent assignments of
property rights would aﬀect the precise fully internalized equilibrium, al-
though we put these issues to one side for now. Such a measure of gain is
implicit in the literature discussed in section 7.2, which produces estimates
of the costs of various kinds of environmental failures in terms of GDP
per capita; but much of this literature is not explicit about the precise
welfare formulation used.
Such measures need not behave in any way that is necessarily collinear
with levels of emissions or intensity of environmental failure. Figure 7.1
showsschematicallyhowacomparisonacrosstwoeconomieswithdiﬀering
levelsofemissionsmayyieldlargergains totheeconomywithsmalleremis-
sions. Here, we represent marginal beneﬁt (MB) and marginal cost (MC)
of abatement functions for two economies. Economy A has more steeply
sloped functions, and in Pareto optimality has smaller abatement than B.
But the gains from abatement (internalization) are larger in A than in B
because of the more shallowly sloped functions in B. Comparing pollutant
levels across economies need give no guide as to the relative size of the
gains from internalization.
The seemingly large estimates we reported earlier of the gains from in-
ternalizing environmental externalities in developing countries also suggest
the perhaps obvious question of why it is that if internalization gains are
so large, more internalization has not occurred. It would be wrong to say
that no internalization has occurred in these countries. At the village level,
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Fig. 7.1 Abatement levels and welfare gains from internalization in two economiesterracing and other schemes are designed to remedy some of the ills of
soil erosion. National environmental regulation often approaches levels of
stringency seen in regulation in developed countries, but is accompanied
by problems of enforcement and compliance. In many developing coun-
tries, environmental nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) are also ex-
tremely active, generating a rising proﬁle for environmental issues in local
policy debate, even though large potential gains from internalization still
seem to remain.
Various explanations abound for the presence of these seemingly large
potential gains. One is that the technology of internalization is both capital
intensive and high cost for low-income countries. Monitoring devices and
administration of environmental fees and ﬁnes all require inputs on a scale
not easily attained in low-income countries. Another is that if environmen-
tal quality is costly to provide, then models with traditional preferences
and technology would naturally imply that abatement levels are lower in
low-income countries. These eﬀects, in turn, would be exacerbated by in-
come elasticities of demand for environmental quality exceeding 1, as is
often claimed.
Another direction explored in recent literature (see Lo ´pez 1998; Maler
1998) is that outside shocks to social systems are a signiﬁcant compound-
ing factor, either disrupting or delaying internalization and producing low-
ered environmental quality. Particularly important in this discussion is the
observation that environmental management systems in developing coun-
tries commonly rely on informal social norms, which can partially or
wholly break down under rapid population growth, technological innova-
tion, or changes in market outcomes. Previously reasonably well-managed
resources can become open-access, poorly managed resources, with wors-
ened environmental quality the result. Dasgupta and Maler (1991) argue
that, viewed in these terms, poverty and degradation can even be reinforc-
ing. Thus, if deforestation moves the available ﬁrewood in forests pro-
gressively further from villages, families may have more children to oﬀset
the increased time required to collect ﬁrewood.8 Population growth is
higher and with it the demand for ﬁrewood, producing further degra-
dation.
7.5 Comparing Policy Regimes in Developed and Developing Countries
We often tend to think of developing countries as following the develop-
mental experience of developed countries with a form of compressed lag.
8. This hypothesis has been tested empirically by Filmer and Pritchett (1996) using house-
hold data for Pakistan for 1991–92. They conclude that households living in areas in which
the distance from ﬁrewood is greater have more children.
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forming themselves ﬁrst from agrarian societies to industrial economies
based on heavy industry (steel and chemicals) to modern high-technology
service-based economies. Developing countries are following this experi-
ence at varying speeds and in diﬀerent ways, but the transition time is
clearly shorter. Korea, for instance, has transformed itself from a country
with lower income per capita than India in the mid-1950s to a lower-
income OECD country today—a 40-year transition. Furthermore, unlike
developed countries at the height of their industrial growth, developing
countries today are under considerable pressure to reduce environmental
stress. This pressure (sometimes backed by the threat of punitive action)
comes from a number of sources, such as governments of developed coun-
tries, international funding agencies, academia, local and international
NGOs, and the developing countries’ own bodies of jurisprudence. Such
pressures were unheard of during the days of rapid industrial growth of
the currently developed countries.
It is only relatively recently, however, that developed countries have
gained the environmental awareness they now have and have developed
systems of environmental management that control emissions, treat waste,
and otherwise abate environmental damage. At the height of the OECD
countries’ industrial revolutions, eﬀectively no environmental controls
were in place.
What then should developing countries do? The experience of developed
countries would seem to indicate that they should adopt few environ-
mental controls and that with income growth environmental quality will
improve. Indeed, a great fear is that attempts to heighten environmental
regulation will only serve to slow growth and, hence, slow eventual
achievement of higher environmental quality through growth. On the
other hand, because of problems of compliance one can argue that per-
haps developing countries have no choice but to follow the older developed
countries’ industrial revolution experience of largely benign neglect.
There are, however, some key diﬀerences in the developing countries’
experience in this area compared to the industrial revolution of old. First,
the time periods involved are compacted, and hence the ﬂow of environ-
mental damage per year during industrialization is larger. Second, the
shocks that hit the economies are also much more severe than was true of
the old industrial revolutionizers. The industrial-revolution-era economies
of the developed countries simply did not experience population growth
rates of 3 percent or more per year, massive growth in urban vehicle densi-
ties, and other elements that contribute to today’s environmental ills in the
developing world. Not only is the process more compact, the time-adjusted
severity of damage probably exceeds that experienced in the OECD 100
years ago. Third, even though weakly administered, there are abatement
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is political opposition, environmental management is taking root.
Thus, the large cost estimates we reported earlier and the scope of envi-
ronmental problems in developing countries suggest to us that a much
more activist environmental policy regime will continue to emerge in devel-
oping countries than was true in industrial countries some 100 years ago
as they grew and industrialized. And, unlike the past, this regime will have
an equal focus on degradation, if not a dominant focus on degradation
over pollution.
7.6 Concluding Remarks
This paper discusses the environmental regime in developing countries,
stressing both the complexity of the regime and the wide-ranging nature
of environmental externalities that go beyond more conventional literature
discussion of pollutant levels. It suggests that a full characterization of this
regime needs to focus on externality problems such as soil erosion, open-
access resources, and congestion problems in urban areas. The paper
stresses that from available studies the gains from internalization of these
externalities seem to be large, potentially exceeding numerical (model-
based) estimates of gains from conventional policy reforms (such as trade
or tax reform) by substantial orders of magnitude. Also, the majority of
such gains seem to arise from internalizing externalities associated with
degradation (soil erosion, open-access resources, and congestion) rather
than pollution. We also stress how existing literature that discusses how
the environmental situation changes with growth (the EKC) covers only
part of the environmental situation; a point that also applies to other parts
of the literature such as that on policy reforms (trade liberalization) and
environmental quality.
Having developed this picture of the environmental regime in devel-
oping countries, the paper concludes by suggesting that a measure is
needed of overall environmental performance in terms of departures from
Pareto optimality so as to give a money-metric welfare measure of the
gains of moving to complete internalization. It also discusses some of the
reasons for the lack of internalization, citing recent literature that argues
that social conventions deﬁning implicit management regimes come under
stress as rapid urbanization, rapid population growth, and other shocks to
social systems occur. The overall theme of the paper, repeated throughout,
is that in discussing the environmental situation in developing countries, a
more comprehensive sense of what this regime comprises is needed.
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Internalization Gains and the Environmental Kuznets Curve
The EKC literature discussed in this chapter seemingly points to the con-
clusion that there is no clear evidence in favor of the EKC. Even though
the EKC itself may be empirically dubious, its welfare interpretation also
has to be highly qualiﬁed. Here, we develop a model where optimality is
deﬁned as internalization, and since such internalization is, in principle,
independent of the level of emissions, the EKC even if it were to exist lacks
any welfare content. We use an amended version of the growth with stock
externalities model, showing that alternative technological assumptions
can give us diﬀerent (optimal) relations between emissions and income,
and each such relation is consistent with perfect internalization. The em-
phasis in the model is on shadow pricing the external eﬀect appropriately
(Ko, Lapan, and Sandler 1992).
In the model, (1) labor is normalized to equal 1. (2) Output, y, depends
upon capital, k, and emissions, e, y  f(k, e). An important point here is
the nature of the relationship between k and e. We assume that fke  0,
(i.e., capital and emissions are substitutes). We further assume that there
exists a level of emissions e such that the marginal product of emissions
for a given level of capital is 0. (3) Capital accumulates according to the
equation
(A1) ˙ (,) , kf k ec k =− − 
where c is consumption and  is the rate of depreciation of capital. (4)
Pollution accumulates according to the relation
(A2) ˙ , Sb S e =− +
where b is ﬁxed.
The social planner’s problem is to choose nonnegative consumption and
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subject to equations (1) and (2). Here U(
) is the instantaneous utility of
the representative consumer and  is the discount rate. The Hamiltonian
for this problem is
(A4) HkSc e Uc S t fke c k t e b S (,, , ) ( ,) ( ) [(, ) ] ( ) ( ) , =+ − − +−    12
where  1 and  2 are costate variables. First-order conditions imply
(A5) Uc =  1,
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with equality if e*( t)  0. The canonical equations are
(A7) 1 ˙ [( / ) ] ,     =+ − ∂ ∂ fk 1
(A8) ˙ [( ) ] / ,    22 =+ − ∂ ∂ bU S
and transversality conditions apply:
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which require that the present value of capital and pollution becomes neg-
ligible at inﬁnity.
This welfare exercise refers to the optimal solution obtained in a com-
mand economy. From the ﬁrst-order conditions we can solve for optimal
consumption and optimal emissions as c*  c(k, S,  1,  2)a n de*  e(k,
S,  1,  2). If we assume that the production and the utility functions are
strictly concave in this case, then for given values of parameters, c*a n d
e*, the issue is how this may be expected to vary with c. If we use this
result of  2, then it follows that, from a welfare point of view, the relation-
ship between consumption and emissions is monotonically falling. Richer
countries will have higher  2 and therefore, lower emissions ceteris paribus
than poorer countries.
In a competitive market economy the representative consumer takes as
given time paths {w(t), r(t), (t)} for tε [0,∞), of wages, interest rates, and
proﬁts. The instantaneous utility of the consumer is deﬁned by U(c, S)a s
before. The consumer sells the ﬁxed labor input (normalized to unity) to a
representative ﬁrm at the market-determined wage rate, and rents out capi-
tal, k(t), at the market rate of interest to the ﬁrm. The representative ﬁrm
maximizes proﬁts under competitive conditions. It generates emissions e(t)
per unit time and pays a tax (t) on these emissions. Total tax proceeds
collected by the government are redistributed to the consumer. The con-
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and  is the rate of depreciation of capital.
The ﬁrm takes as given (and has perfect foresight about) time paths of
emissions taxes {(t), tε, [0,∞)} along with the time paths of wage and
interest. The ﬁrm can reduce its tax liabilities by reducing output. Output
is produced according to a standard neoclassical production function so
that the ﬁrm chooses k(t)a n de(t) to solve the problem
(FP) max ( ) ( ( ), ( )) ( ) ( ) ()() .  t f kt et rtkt tet =− −
Given that the consumer perfectly predicts the time paths of {w(t), r(t),
(t)} and the ﬁrm perfectly predicts the time paths of {w(t), r(t), (t)},
then the consumer will determine consumption demand (cd) and capital
supply (ks), whereas the ﬁrm will determine consumption supply (c s)a n d
capital demand (k d) and the emissions e(t). The paths {w(t), r(t), (t), (t)}
are a perfect foresight competitive equilibrium with emissions taxes if the
solution {c s(t), k d(t), e(t)} of equation (FP) is such that if proﬁts are deﬁned
by (t)  f(k(t), e(t))  r(t) k(t)  (t) e(t) for each t and if {c d(t), ks(t)}
solves equation (CP), then for all tε [0,∞)w eh a v e( 1 )cd(t)  c s(t) goods
market or ﬂow equilibrium; (2) ks(t)  k d(t) capital market or stock equi-
librium; (3) ec(t) is the competitive emissions; and (4) S  e c(t)  bS(t),
S(0)  S0 (evolution of pollution stock).
An examination of the planner’s problem in equation (A1) immediately
reveals that if the emissions tax is deﬁned as (t)   2(t)/ 1(t), the compet-
itive equilibrium solutions for equations (CP) and (FP) for the ﬁrm are
identical to the solution of the social optimization problem. To see this,
assume that equation (FP) has an interior solution; then we must have
(A10) ∂∂ = fk r /,
(A11) ∂∂= fe /. 
These determine the demand for capital and the competitive supply of
emissions. Given this, then the consumer maximizes the following Hamil-
tonian:
(A12) HU c S t r k ec k =++ + − − (, ) () ( ) .   
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
(A13) ∂∂= Uc /, 
(A14) ˙ () ,    =+ − r
(A15) with  ˙ () . kr k e c k k k =+ + − − =  0 0
The transversality conditions are










If we compare this solution to that for the planner’s problem, it is clear
that for   1 and    2/ 1 the solutions to the two problems are
identical. Hence, by solving the social optimization problem and using
an optimal and ﬂexible emissions duty, the planner can induce proﬁt-
maximizing ﬁrms to follow the socially desirable emissions policy.
An important implication of the solution to the market problem is that
if we have incomplete internalization (   2/ 1), then this carries a wel-
fare cost. The EKC, even if it is observed, then does not give any indication
of the welfare cost of noninternalization across countries.
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Comment Edward B. Barbier
The paper by Jha and Whalley on the environmental regimes found in
developing countries is a timely and cogently written analysis of the sub-
ject. The authors review a wide range of literature and, in doing so, cover
many issues concerning the diverse environmental problems faced by de-
veloping countries.
The authors conﬁne their analysis of this potentially broad topic to
three main points. First, they argue that, although much attention has
focused on the growing welfare implications of increased pollution levels
in developing countries, problems of degradation (i.e., soil erosion, defor-
estation, overexploitation of ﬁsheries, etc.) deserve much more attention.
Second, available evidence on the economic costs to developing countries
of environmental problems suggests that these costs are large, particularly
with respect to the degradation problems. Finally, citing evidence from the
emerging environmental Kuznets curve (EKC) and trade and environment
literature, the authors point out that the relationship between growth, pol-
icy reform, and environmental quality may diﬀer signiﬁcantly depending
on whether one is examining degradation or pollution problems. The au-
thors conclude by examining a perplexing issue: If the welfare costs of
many environmental externalities are so great in developing countries, why
has more internalization of these costs not occurred?
I would like to make some general observations concerning these key
points of the paper. First, I commend the authors for basing their paper
on a distinction between conventional pollution problems and a wider,
more pervasive problems of environmental degradation in developing
countries. The need to make such a distinction is critical for analyzing
environmental and resource issues in developing countries, because the
fundamental economic and physical processes underlying degradation
problems require a diﬀerent approach to analyzing degradation as op-
posed to pollution problems (Barbier 1989; Dasgupta 1982). Unfortu-
nately, we still need to improve our understanding of the economic aspects
of environmental degradation in developing countries. As the discipline of
environmental and resource economics has been developed largely in the
richer or advanced industrialized countries, most of the analytical ap-
proaches are better suited to analyzing more conventional environmental
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partment of Economics and Finance, University of Wyoming.problems such as pollution, nonrenewable depletion, and standard timber-
and ﬁshery-harvesting issues. More complex environmental problems,
such as poverty, land degradation, and deforestation linkages in devel-
oping countries, clearly require a diﬀerent category of analysis and one
focusing in particular on the incentives of poor rural households to man-
age their land and other resources at their disposal (Barbier 1997a).
However, I do have some issues to raise concerning the way in which
the authors distinguish environmental pollution and degradation “exter-
nalities,” as indicated in table 7.1 of the chapter. In turn, these issues lead
to more substantive points detailing why environmental degradation is a
fundamental development problem in low-income countries.
It is important to recognize that two types of environmental externalities
can occur through environmental degradation and pollution: ﬂow exter-
nalities and stock externalities. The former is the more common type of
third-party externality that is associated with conventional pollution prob-
lems, or as listed in the table, soil erosion and pesticide runoﬀ (inciden-
tally, the latter is really an agrochemical pollution problem and not a “soil
quality” issue as table 7.1 suggests). In contrast, stock externalities arise
through nonoptimal depletion of a renewable resource stock over time;
that is, they represent the forgone future income associated with excessive
depletion or overexploitation of a resource today. The authors seem to
imply that the open-access resources of forests, ﬁsheries, and aquifers may
suﬀer from overexploitation, hence causing a stock externality problem.
However, suboptimal depletion, degradation, or overexploitation of any
type of resource stock (renewable, semirenewable, or nonrenewable) can
lead to stock externalities. For example, later in the paper, the authors
quote numerous estimates of the on-site cost of soil erosion across devel-
oping countries, which is essentially the stock externality problem of the
forgone crop income arising from excessive topsoil and soil-fertility deple-
tion. Yet, surprisingly, this erosion cost is not included in table 7.1. An
equally surprising omission is depletion of freshwater resources, which has
been cited as a critical environmental issue in developing countries in com-
ing decades by a number of international sources, including those cited by
the authors (UNDP 1998; WRI 1996).
This point may seem trivial, but it is not. The authors suggest, correctly
in my view, that in developing countries resource degradation problems
may be economically more signiﬁcant than pollution. However, it is also
possible that the most signiﬁcant economic costs associated with resource
degradation in developing countries take the form of the forgone income
associated with resource depletion and degradation stock externalities,
rather than the conventional ﬂow externalities associated with air and wa-
ter pollution, oﬀ-site impacts of sedimentation, and agrochemical runoﬀ.
This in turn implies that developing countries should be more concerned
about the stock externalities arising from resource degradation, because
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nomic development eﬀorts more directly. The authors are clearly acknowl-
edging this point, at least implicitly, by stressing that resource degradation
imposes disproportionately high welfare costs on these economies. This is
certainly true. However, a more fundamental reason why this is the case is
that many poor countries continue to remain economically dependent on
natural resources for their current development eﬀorts, and, for the fore-
seeable future, eﬃcient and sustainable management of this resource base
is critical to sustaining economic development. Hence, given the economic
importance of many rural renewable resources in these economies, it is not
surprising that degradation of these resources imposes signiﬁcantly large
welfare losses and economic costs.
There is also evidence emerging from the recent literature suggesting
that developing countries endowed with abundant natural resources are
wasting this potential “natural capital” wealth rather than eﬃciently ex-
ploiting it for sustainable economic development. For example, many low-
income and lower-middle-income economies—especially those displaying
low or stagnant growth rates—are highly resource dependent (Barbier
1994). Not only do these economies rely principally on direct exploitation
of their resource bases through primary industries (e.g., agriculture, for-
estry, and ﬁshing), but also over 50 percent or more of their export earn-
ings come from a few primary commodities. These economies tend to be
heavily indebted and are experiencing dramatic land-use changes—es-
pecially conversion of forest area to agriculture—as well as problems of
low agricultural productivity, land degradation, and population-carrying-
capacity constraints. A recent cross-country analysis by Sachs and Warner
(1995) conﬁrms that resource-abundant countries (i.e., countries with a
high ratio of natural resource exports to GDP) have tended to grow less
rapidly than countries that are relatively resource poor.
Explanations as to why resource dependence may be a factor in inﬂu-
encing economic growth point to a number of possible fundamental link-
ages among environment, innovation, trade, and long-term growth that are
relevant to poor economies. For example, the limitations of resource-based
development have been examined by Matsuyama (1992) and Sachs and
Warner (1995). Matsuyama shows that trade liberalization in a land-
intensive economy could actually slow economic growth by inducing the
economy to shift resources away from manufacturing (which produces
learning-induced growth) toward agriculture (which does not). Sachs and
Warner extend the Matsuyama model to allow for the full “Dutch disease”
inﬂuences of a mineral- or oil-based economy; that is, when an economy
experiences a resource boom, the manufacturing sector tends to shrink
and the non-traded-goods sector tends to expand. The authors’ theoretical
and empirical analyses support the view that a key factor inﬂuencing en-
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manufacturing versus natural resource sectors in the economy.
Of course, such models do not include the eﬀects of resource degrada-
tion or depletion per se. However, it is fairly straightforward to demon-
strate some of the possible inﬂuences of environmental-asset depletion on
innovation and growth in a resource-dependent economy, as well as the
role of policy and institutional failures in this process (Barbier 1999; Bar-
bier and Homer-Dixon 1999). In terms of policy implications, this suggests
that low-income countries should be pursuing a two-pronged strategy for
sustained economic development. On the one hand, correcting problems
of chronic policy failures, social instabilities, and poor institutions that
inhibit innovation and long-term growth prospects should also enhance
the capacity of these economies to reinvest the rents from natural-resource
exploitation into more dynamic and advanced sectors of the economy
(Barbier 1999; Matsuyama 1992; Sachs and Warner 1995). However, fo-
cusing simply on policies and institutions to foster improved innovation
in the advanced economic sectors of low-income economies may not be
suﬃcient. Because these economies are highly dependent on their natural
resource base for economic growth and development over the medium
term, the take-oﬀ into higher growth rates and economic development will
be directly related to their ability to manage natural resources eﬃciently
and sustainably over the medium to long term. Once again, therefore, we
are back to the main issue raised by the authors of this paper: The need for
developing countries to recognize the economic consequences and welfare
losses arising from pervasive rural resource degradation.
A major cause of environmental degradation in developing countries is
the distortion in economic incentives caused by misguided policies. Curi-
ously, Jha and Whalley do not discuss this aspect of the problem very
much in their paper. Yet there is substantial evidence emerging that policy
distortions and failures are a key factor in the economic disincentives for
rural households to improve long-term, eﬃcient management at their dis-
posal (Barbier 1997a). There are two aspects of this disincentives prob-
lem that are routinely ignored by policymakers. First, empirical evidence
suggests that poorer households in rural developing regions are more
constrained in their access to credit, inputs, and research and extension
services necessary for investments in improved land and resource manage-
ment. Poverty, imperfect capital markets, and insecure land tenure may
reinforce the tendency toward short-term time horizons in production de-
cisions, which may bias land-use decisions against long-term management
strategies. Second, poverty may severely constrain the ability of poor
households to compete for resources, including high-quality, productive
land. In periods of commodity booms and land speculation, wealthier
households generally take advantage of their superior political and market
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ture a larger share of the resource rents. Poorer households are either con-
ﬁned to marginal land areas where resource rents are limited or only have
access to higher-quality resources once they are degraded and any rents
dissipated.
Economic and sectoral policies in developing countries usually reinforce
these structural disincentives for improved land management rather than
mitigating them. For example, in Colombia distortions in the land market
prevent small farmers from attaining access to existing fertile land (Heath
and Binswanger 1996). That is, because the market value of farm land is
only partly based on its agricultural production potential, the market price
of arable land in Colombia generally exceeds the capitalized value of farm
proﬁts. As a result, poorer smallholders and, of course, landless workers
cannot aﬀord to purchase land out of farm proﬁts, nor do they have the
nonfarm collateral to ﬁnance such purchases in the credit market. In con-
trast, large land holdings serve as a hedge against inﬂation for wealthier
households, and land is a preferred form of collateral in credit markets.
Hence, the speculative and nonfarming beneﬁts of large land holdings fur-
ther bid up the price of land, thus ensuring that only wealthier households
can aﬀord to purchase land, even though much of the land may be unpro-
ductively farmed or even idle.
Thus unless better policies are designed to correct such fundamental
distortions in low-income economies, the disincentives for improved land
management will remain. This in turn implies that economic growth in
developing countries will continue to be accompanied by rapid land-use
change and resource degradation.
As the authors imply, evidence that this may be a problem is emerging
from the recent EKC literature. Recently I had the privilege of editing a
special journal issue on the EKC. In my review of the literature, it became
clear that perhaps the only signiﬁcant resource-depletion indicator that
has been examined for evidence of an EKC relationship has been defores-
tation (Barbier 1997b). However, as Jha and Whalley have also indicated,
the evidence on this relationship is mixed. Some studies suggest that defor-
estation conforms to the EKC hypothesis; others have found it diﬃcult to
establish a relationship between any indicator of deforestation and income
(Cropper and Griﬃths 1994; Shaﬁk 1994; Antle and Heidebrink 1995;
Panayotou 1995). Perhaps most worrying is that, where an EKC relation-
ship for deforestation has been established, the real per capita income lev-
els of virtually all developing countries in the world are well to the left of
the turning-point level of income on the curve, where deforestation starts
to decline. The implications of this for medium-term global deforestation
trends were illustrated when colleagues and I combined an estimated EKC
deforestation relationship with aggregated forecasts of income and popula-
tion levels for individual countries (Stern, Common, and Barbier 1996).
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square kilometers in 1990 to a minimum of 37.2 million square kilometers
in 2016, and then increases slightly to 37.6 million square kilometers in
2025. However, in stark contrast, over the same period tropical forests are
nearly halved from 18.4 to 9.7 million square kilometers.
On a more positive note, recent studies also demonstrate that EKCs are
highly susceptible to structural economic shifts and technological changes,
which are in turn inﬂuenced by policy. For example, Komen, Gerking, and
Folmer (1997) point to the key role of public investments for environmen-
tal improvements in reducing environmental degradation as income levels
rise, which may explain the strong EKC and even decreasing relationships
found for some pollution indicators in OECD countries. Panayotou (1997)
ﬁnds that improved policies and institutions in the form of more secure
property rights, better enforcement of contracts, and eﬀective environmen-
tal regulations can help to ﬂatten the EKC for SO2 across countries.
There are also encouraging signs that reform of environmental policy is
beginning to progress in developing countries. For example, a recent re-
view by the World Bank (1997) identiﬁes a vast range of such environmen-
tal policy innovations that have been implemented across the globe since
the 1992 Rio Environment and Development Conference to improve re-
source management and control pollution. Of particular importance is
that many of these policies are being adopted by developing countries and
that they include market-based instruments as well as removal of major
policy distortions (see Huber, Ruitenbeek, and Sero ˆa da Motta 1998). In
addition, some of these reforms have been targeted at improved land and
forestry management. What is more, they are being implemented as part
of more general economy-wide and sector-speciﬁc reforms in these econo-
mies. This is an exciting prospect because it suggests that market-based
instruments, the removal of economic disincentives, and environmental
policy improvements are being considered together as important instru-
ments in improving the link between economy and environment, thus help-
ing to reverse the chain of unsustainable development in poorer econ-
omies.
Finally, I endorse the general view expressed by the authors that the
potential welfare gains from the internalization of environmental degrada-
tion externalities in developing countries are likely to be large. Further
studies of these potential gains are therefore an important priority. In sup-
port of this view, the authors cite the few available studies that attempt
such valuations, including estimates of the cost of soil erosion in devel-
oping countries contained in a recent paper of mine (which is now pub-
lished as Barbier 1998). However, my paper also sounds a note of caution
about such cost estimates. Virtually all of the studies of the on-site costs
of soil erosion in developing countries that I have reviewed have involved
a very ﬂawed methodological approach for estimating this cost. In most
The Environmental Regime in Developing Countries 247cases, this has led to inaccurate estimates of the income losses associated
with erosion. Although this has been inevitable given the data limitation
and other constraints faced by many of the studies, as I outline in my
paper, it is time that we begin employing more methodologically sound
approaches and thus improve our estimations of the economic costs of
land degradation in developing countries. I believe this view is shared by
Jha and Whalley in their paper.
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